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Abstract 
In financing start-up firms, venture capitalists carefully select among alternative projects, design 
incentive compatible financial contracts and support portfolio companies with value enhancing 
managerial advice. This paper considers how venture capitalists can induce self-selection among 
entrepreneurial firms with different qualities and growth potential by designing appropriate contracts 
and offering managerial support. We study the efficiency of the competitive market equilibrium with 
respect to the level and quality of entrepreneurship and the level of effort by entrepreneurs and 





Venture capital, entrepreneurship, self-selection, moral hazard. 
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Venture capital backed ﬁrms are more innovative, grow larger and create more value than
other bank ﬁnanced ﬁrms. Kortum and Lerner (2000) ﬁnd that a disproportionately large
share of industrial innovation originates in ﬁrms ﬁnanced with venture capital (VC).1
Based on a sample of start-up ﬁrms in Silicon valley, Hellmann and Puri (2000, 2002)
estimate the value added of venture capitalists (VCs) to company development. The
strategic advice and the monitoring activities of VCs promote the commercialization of
portfolio companies and helps them to exploit better their growth potential.2 It has often
been argued, however, that much of the superior performance of VC backed compared
to bank ﬁnanced companies might not be due to the value added activities of VCs. It
might rather result from the fact that VCs are simply more successful in selecting the
more promising ﬁrms in the pool of all start-ups. Kaplan and Stromberg (2001, 2004)
indeed point to the importance of both the screening and advising activities of VCs. Quite
consistent with this, the empirical study of Sorensen (2005) ﬁnds that about 50 percent
of the extra performance of VC backed ﬁr m si sd u et ot h ea d v i s o r ys u p p o r to fV Cﬁrms,
and the rest to their screening activities.
A good descriptive model of the VC industry should therefore pay due attention to
the implications of both selection and advice for the quality of VC ﬁnancing. We build on
our own previous research in modeling the productive contribution of VCs to their port-
folio companies in terms of advice and managerial support (Kanniainen and Keuschnigg,
2003, and Keuschnigg and Nielsen, 2003, 2004a,b). We now extend this research by al-
lowing for quality diﬀerences among projects as is emphasized in the literature of adverse
selection.3 There are three main diﬀerences with this literature: (i) we allow for only
two qualities instead of a continuum to simplify the model; (ii) we combine this with a
1See Da Rin, Nicodano and Sembenelli (2005) on innovation ﬁnancing with VC and the impact of
public policy in Europe.
2See Gompers and Lerner (1999) for a standard reference on empirical work on VC ﬁnancing and
Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2005) for a collection of policy oriented contributions.
3See e.g. DeMeza and Webb (1987) and the survey of the subsequent literature by De Meza (2002).
Boadway and Keen (2004) synthesize diﬀerent models which mostly consider pooling equilibria. For an
analyis of separating equilibria see Innes (1990) and Fuest and Tillessen (2005), among others.
3double moral hazard problem after a contract is signed. The moral hazard relates to the
entrepreneur’s managerial eﬀort in building the company and the VC’s advisory support
to magnify company growth. And (iii), we combine this with the self-selection model of
Hall (2005) to endogenize entry into entrepreneurship. The result is a quite tractable
model that rationalizes the use of convertible debt in VC ﬁnancing and allows to consider
the characteristics and eﬃciency of market equilibrium.4 We show how certain structural
parameters of the VC industry lead VCs to adjust their convertible debt contracts to
attract a better selection of ﬁrms and to assure optimal incentives for managerial eﬀort
and advisory support. We are thus able to characterize the quantity and quality of VC
ﬁnanced entrepreneurship.
When start-ups invent new and untested products, the technological risk in making
the product ready for production and the market potential of the innovation may be larger
or smaller. It is thus assumed that ideas of entrepreneurs have either high or low quality,
leading to large or small market potential in case of success. Entrepreneurs have not
enough own capital and therefore need outside ﬁnance to start the ﬁrm. Initially, neither
the entrepreneur nor the VC know the true quality of the project. Entrepreneurs, however,
receive an informative signal on the potential of their project that allows them to revise
their prior expectations. Depending on the ﬁnancing contracts on oﬀer, agents self-select
into entrepreneurship if they receive a suﬃciently good signal indicating that their project
is likely to be a high quality one. Once a ﬁrm is started and the collaboration between
the VC and entrepreneur begins, the project quality becomes known. The probability of
success of either type may still be advanced by managerial eﬀort and VC advice, either
to increase expected proﬁts or to cut losses. On average, bad quality ﬁrms result in a loss
and high quality ﬁrms yield proﬁts.
To shed light on the policy implications of the model, we clarify the welfare properties
of the market equilibrium with respect to self-selected entry of entrepreneurs and the
managerial and advisory eﬀort levels. Entry results in an average quality of start-ups
while eﬀort levels determine the success probability of each type of ﬁrm. We ﬁnd that
4See Casamatta (2003) and Schmidt (2003) for theoretical analysis on the role of convertible in-
struments. Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) and Cumming (2005) document the empirical importance of
convertible instruments in VC ﬁnancing.
4the double moral hazard between entrepreneurs and VCs leads to an ineﬃciently low
eﬀort level. The reasons for this underinvestment are well known from our own previous
research, or by the analysis of Schmidt (2003). Since an entrepreneur has insuﬃcient own
resources to start a project, he needs outside ﬁnance and must share the returns with the
ﬁnancier. Consequently, during the start-up phase, the entrepreneur and VC must each
bear the full cost of their own eﬀort but must share the returns to eﬀort among them.
On the other hand, entrepreneurial entry is excessive. VCs incur a loss on bad projects
and need to cross-subsidize them with proﬁts from good projects. Limited liability pre-
vents that entrepreneurs could pay for these losses. As a result of cross-subsidization,
entrepreneurs who are endowed with a bad project with relatively high probability get a
too favorable deal. They are thus too eager to start ﬁrms that should not get started. This
result is in line with the adverse selection models of DeMeza and Webb (1987, 2002). The
policy implications are immediate. The model calls for higher quality but fewer numbers
of start-up ﬁrms. To improve the eﬃciency of the market equilibrium, one needs to look
for policies that are able to stimulate eﬀo r tb u ta tt h es a m et i m et or e d u c ee n t r yi n t oV C
backed entrepreneurship.
The next section sets up the model and analyzes the constrained optimal allocation.
Section 3 derives competitive market equilibrium and investigates its eﬃciency properties
by comparing to the optimal allocation. Section 4 discusses the results of comparative
static analysis of the industry equilibrium with respect to key taste and technology para-
meters. Section 5 concludes and points out possible avenues for future research.
2 The Model
Potential entrepreneurs have ideas for new products, good and bad ones, but are endowed
with little own wealth k.T os t a r taﬁrm, they need outside ﬁnance since the necessary
capital investment I>kexceeds own capital. Entrepreneurs not only lack own capital but
also managerial experience. They would beneﬁt from professional support of a seasoned
VC who has industry knowledge, can give advice and add value by sharing his own
managerial know-how. VC ﬁnancing of new ﬁrms involves the following sequence of
5events: (i) VCs oﬀer outside ﬁnancing, covering at least I − k, and announce the type
of contracts that they oﬀer. (ii) Agents have an idea for a project which may be good
or bad, j ∈ {G,B}. The true share of good projects is ε but agents do not know in
advance whether their project is good. They receive a signal y indicating that the project
is good with probability q. A higher signal value means a higher probability of the project
being good. If y is suﬃciently large, agents opt for entrepreneurship and apply for outside
ﬁnance. If not, they turn to alternative employment in industry, earning a ﬁxed wage w
and deriving end of period wealth w + k. Interest on assets is normalized to zero. (iii)
After the business is launched and investment I is sunk, the true quality of the project
is revealed to both VC and entrepreneur as a result of their early collaboration. (iv)
Knowing quality, agents spend eﬀort and advice to boost the success probability. Even
if the project turned out to have low potential, eﬀort is spent in order to limit expected
losses. (v) Good and bad projects yield outcome vG or vB and the payments according
to the terms of contract are executed. The model is solved backwards.
2.1 Venture Capital Financing
If a project succeeds, it generates a value vG >v B on the output market. When it fails,
revenue is zero, leaving expected revenue pjvj. The success probability pj is speciﬁct o
the type which is revealed after the project starts but before full eﬀort is expended. The
success of the ﬁrm depends on the entrepreneur’s eﬀo r ta n dt h ed e g r e eo fV Cs u p p o r t .
To simplify, we assume that managerial eﬀo r ti sd i s c r e t ea n dc a nb ee i t h e rh i g ho rl o w ,
lj ∈ {0,1}. The entrepreneur’s eﬀort is critical for the success chances of the ﬁrm. The
company would always fail if the entrepreneur shirks and puts in low eﬀort. VC advice aj
is a more gradual matter and is treated as a continuous variable. Both eﬀorts determine
the success probability
pj = p
j (lj,a j)=lj · (aj)
α , 0 <α<1. (1)
The key condition is that pj is increasing in each eﬀort level and strictly concave in VC
advice. Eﬀorts are complements. The marginal return p
j
l of managerial eﬀort increases if





6When the VC oﬀers a contract, she does not yet know the type of the company but she
anticipates that she will learn the project type after starting collaboration. The contract
thus includes a convertible option that can be exercised when this information becomes
available after the investment is sunk but before the outcome is realized. The contract
consists of (i) a credit I − k, (ii) a share sB of proﬁts if the project turns out bad,5 and
(iii) an option to increase the equity stake to sG >s B at a conversion price b. The option
can be exercised after the project is started and its type is revealed to both parties. It
will naturally be proﬁtable to exercise the option when the project turns out good. In all
cases, both agents receive a zero repayment if the project fails and no revenue is generated.
T h eV Ct h u sg e t sp a i db a c ko n l yi nc a s eo fs u c c e s s .
After a contract is signed, the project speciﬁcp r o ﬁts h a r e ssj are ﬁxed. It is assumed
that the early cooperation of the team reveals the potential of the project. Knowing the
type of the project and the corresponding proﬁt share after the VC has exercised her
conversion option, eﬀorts aj and lj can be tailored to it, giving a success rate pj as in (1).
During the start-up period, agents choose their own eﬀort, taking the input by the other
party as given, and thereby maximize the rent
R
E
j =m a x lj p
j (lj,a j) · (1 − sj) · vj − βlj,
R
F
j =m a x aj p






j (lj,a j) · vj − βlj − γaj.
The upper indices E and F refer to entrepreneurs and VC ﬁnanciers. Since the success
probability is concave in advice, VCs can expect a rent which compensates them for their
eﬀort cost and earlier pecuniary expenses.
After a deal is struck, the ﬁrm must make a uniform capital investment I where a part
k is ﬁnanced out of own equity and I −k b yt h eV C .A p a r tf r o mt h i sc r e d i t ,t h ec o n t r a c t
speciﬁes proﬁts h a r e ssj and ﬁxed payments bj. When exercising the conversion option,
t h eV Ct h u sp a y sa ne x t r abG = b. Naturally, when the project is revealed as bad, the
VC does not convert, yielding bB =0 . Optimality would in fact require a negative price
(bB < 0) or a payment from the entrepreneur to the VC which is prevented by limited
5The amouont sBvB can also be interpreted as a debt repayment, leaving vB − sBvB to E.
7liability. Taking account of the optional payment bj, the entrepreneur expects a total
value RE
j + bj while the VC claims RF
j − bj − (I − k).
Agents are endowed with good and bad ideas. However, nobody knows in advance
whether an idea is good or bad, not even the entrepreneur herself. The true proportion of
good ideas in the population is ε, a fraction 1−ε of agents are endowed with a bad idea.
The share ε is the prior probability for a high quality project which is the same for all
potential entrepreneurs. However, agents receive a signal y that is positively correlated
with project quality. If an agent receives a high value of the signal, her idea is very likely
to be good. She updates her perceived probability of a good idea to q(y) >ε , giving a
probability 1−q of being stuck with a bad idea. If an agent receives a bad signal instead,
she expects to have a good project with a low probability q(y) <ε . Even though all are
identical in other respects, they continuously diﬀer in the signal received and therefore in
the expected project quality q. Agents who received a better signal are also more probable
to have a good idea, q0 >qfor y0 >y . Given a marginal probability q of an agent with
signal y, one obtains an average probability Q>qof having a good project where the
average is taken over all agents with signals y0 >y . Appendix A explains details. From
now on, we deﬁne the quality of a project as the probability that it is of a good type.
It is important to note that the average quality increases with the marginal quality,
dQ/dq > 0. In fact, by assuming a speciﬁc functional form of the distribution of signals




q +( 1− q)θ
>q , θ<1, (3)
where θ parameterizes the information content of the signal. If θ =1 , the signal would
not be informative and agents could not update their prior probability ε so that all would
expect to have a good project with the same probability q = ε, implying Q = ε as well. If
the signal is informative, then the perceived probability of a good project q(y) increases
with the signal received, and so does the average probability Q taken over all agents with
even better signals.
When an agent considers entrepreneurship, the type of the project is not yet known.
She thus reckons with two possible events: (i) With probability q, her project is good and
8has value RE
G+bG. (ii) With probability 1−q,i ti sb a db u ti sﬁnanced nevertheless, yielding
RE
B +bB,w h e r ebB > 0. In both cases, the entrepreneur gives up k to pay part of I.T h e











To simplify notation, we will write qj meaning qG = q and qB =1−q. The entrepreneur’s










− k − w ≥ 0. (4)
The VC’s surplus from a project of type q is πF.T h eV Cﬁnances only the part I − k of
what the entrepreneur cannot ﬁnance herself. Comparing with (4) yields a joint surplus

























j qj · Rj − w − I.
To get the average surplus over all projects ﬁnanced, substitute q and 1−q from (A.2)
into (5) and multiply the result by the denominator of (A.2). Next, integrate over y0 > y
and note Hj (y) as well as E (y)=
R ∞
y e(y0)dy0 by (A.1-3). Divide by E (y) and note





E (y). Again we use the notation Qj with QG = Q and

























j Qj · Rj − w − I.
We close the model by deriving GDP and thereby obtain a welfare measure. To this








j Qj · [sjpjvj − γaj − bj] − (I − k), (7)
Π =
P
j Qj · [pjvj − βlj − γaj] − w − I.
9With population normalized to unity, the number of entrepreneurs obtaining VC ﬁnancing
is equal to the number of applications, E<1.As h a r eQ of them is endowed with a good
project and a share 1 − Q with a bad one. GDP, or end of period income, is k plus the
output of workers, each producing w,a n do fs t a r t - u pﬁrms, after subtracting various costs.
T h ew e l f a r em e a s u r em u s ta l s ot a k ea c c o u n to fa l ln o n - p e c u n i a r ye ﬀort costs. Welfare is
Y = w + k + ΠE. Upon substitution of ΠE and using the deﬁnition of L + E =1 ,
Y =( w + k)L +
hP
j Qj · (pjvj − βlj − γaj) − (I − k)
i
· E. (8)
GDP consists of wealth plus output of workers, (w + k)L, plus output of (good and
bad) entrepreneurial ﬁrms, net of start-up costs (I − k)E. Subtracting eﬀort costs yields
welfare Y .
2.2 Eﬃcient Allocation
The constrained optimal allocation q∗, l∗
j, a∗
j maximizes welfare Y = w + k + ΠE by
directly allocating resources subject to the restriction that the government does not know
more than private parties. Since w and k are exogenous, we need to consider only ΠE.
Substituting Π from (6) and noting QjE = εjEj (y) by (A.3) and E =
P
j εjEj (y) yields
ΠE =
P
j εjEj (y) · [p(lj,a j)vj − βlj − γaj] − (I + w)E. (9)
Maximize Y subject to y = φ(q) as deﬁned in (A.2-4). Use dEj/dy = −ej, εjej = qje










l · vj − β
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a · vj − γ
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The ﬁrst two conditions determine eﬃcient eﬀort levels. Since p
j
la > 0,e ﬀorts are
complements. If the VC advises more intensively, the success probability increases which
strengthens entrepreneur’s incentives for high eﬀort. Conversely, if the entrepreneur
10shirks, the project never succeeds and yields no revenue. That cannot be optimal and
must be ruled out. Given the functional form in (1), optimal VC advice is calculated by
the second condition above. Advice is positive only if entrepreneurial eﬀort is high. Hence,
p
j
lvj > β must hold by the ﬁrst condition. Substituting optimal advice, this condition
gives a restriction on parameters to assure an interior solution,
a
∗









vj > β ⇔ vj > (γ/α)
α β
1−α. (11)
Advice is higher with the good project. Hence, if the condition for high managerial eﬀort
is fulﬁl l e df o rt h eb a dp r o j e c t ,i ti saf o r t i o r if u l ﬁlled for the good project as well.
O n es h o u l dn o t et h a tt h eﬁrst two conditions result from maximizing the joint rent
in (2), yielding R0 (vj)=pj > 0. Rents strictly increase in project value vj on account
of the envelope theorem with respect to advice. We denote by R∗
j the joint rent with the







j qj · R
∗
j − I − w
i
· eφ
0 (q)=0 . (12)
Using qG = q and qB =1− q, socially optimal entry is given by the marginal quality
q
∗ =






This condition reveals that bad projects must make a loss for there to be a well deﬁned
interior solution of the constrained optimal allocation. We henceforth assume
R
∗
B − I − w<0. (14)
3 Competitive Market Equilibrium
The model is solved backwards. (i) We solve for eﬀort and advice and ﬁnd the resulting
rents to eﬀort. (ii) We characterize the overall surplus and ﬁnd the optimal VC contract
given by proﬁts h a r e ssj and the conversion price b.S h a r e ssj reﬂect proﬁt maximization
of VCs with respect to each individual project when the implications for eﬀort are cor-
rectly anticipated. To highlight the role of the limited liability constraint, we start with
11unrestricted prices bj by allowing bB to be negative. Imposing limited liability bB =0
then gives the relevant case where b = bG stands for the conversion price that is due
whenever the VC upgrades her stake to sG >s B.T h ep r i c e sbj result from competition
among VCs for good projects and their desire to deter bad types which result in a loss.
On average, competitive VCs must at least break even on their investments. (iii) We
ﬁnally determine entrepreneurial entry as it results from self-selection based on signals
and the oﬀered contracts.
3.1 Eﬀort, Advice and ProﬁtS h a r e s
The solution is by backward induction. Given proﬁt shares, entrepreneurs and VCs strive
to maximize the rent from their productive inputs to the company. When maximizing
(2), each party takes the action of the other party as given. The incentive compatibility
conditions are the ﬁrst order condition with respect to advice and the inequality resulting
from the discrete comparison of rents for low and high managerial eﬀort. Quite obviously,
the VC leaves a high enough a proﬁts h a r e1−sj to the entrepreneur to assure her critical
eﬀort. Otherwise there would be no revenue at all:
aj : p
j
a (lj,a j)sjvj = γ, lj : p
j
l (lj,a j)(1− sj)vj − β > 0. (15)
The VC chooses optimal advice, taking the previously announced proﬁts h a r e ssj and the
entrepreneur’s eﬀort as given. Advice increases with her own share. The entrepreneur
acts the same. Her share must be high enough to induce high eﬀort, lj =1 .
Ar e d u c t i o ni nsj would reduce the VC’s proﬁt and incentives for advice without any
extra gain on the entrepreneur’s critical input. As long as managerial eﬀort remains high,
the VC can increase her proﬁt by raising her own share, dRF
j d/sj = pjvj > 0 by the
envelope theorem. Proﬁt maximization thus leads the VC to raise sj as much as possible
until the entrepreneur’s incentive compatibility condition in (15) binds with equality.
Raising the share beyond this value would lead to a discontinuous drop in rents to zero
since the entrepreneur would not provide her critical eﬀort anymore. The equilibrium
proﬁt share and level of VC support are thus given by the two constraints in (15) holding




The value of the proﬁt share pins down the level of advice which is smaller than the
ﬁrst best level noted in (11). From a social perspective, the VC should be full residual
claimant on her input. However, the need to provide incentives to the entrepreneur limits
her share in the market equilibrium, leading to underinvestment in advice. Knowing the
VC’s stake sj and her level of support aj,w ec a ni n f e rh e rr e n t .
Proposition 1 (a) Given the form in (1), the VC’s proﬁts h a r e sf u l ﬁll 1 >s G >s B >α .
(b) The VC’s share sj and the level of advice aj increase in project value vj but decline in
marginal eﬀort costs β of entrepreneurs and γ of VCs. (c) The entrepreneur’s rent RE
j
is zero, her proﬁt share exactly compensates for managerial eﬀort cost. The VC gets the
entire joint rent Rj which increases with project value but falls with marginal eﬀort costs.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Noting aj · pj
a = α · pj as implied by (1) and using the optimality condition (15) to
substitute for γ yields a convenient closed form for the VC’s rent
R
F
j =( 1− α)sjpjvj,R
E
j =( 1− sj)pjvj − β =0 . (17)
The entrepreneur cannot earn any rent since the success probability is linear in managerial
eﬀort. Her rent thus coincides with the incentive compatibility constraint in (15) which
was shown to be binding in equilibrium. The entrepreneur must nevertheless appropriate
a surplus to make her willing to forgo other career opportunities. Her expected surplus
derives from selling the share sj to the VC at a price that will exceed the capital costs of
the venture by an amount bj to be determined below. With RE
j =0 ,t h eﬁnancier’s rent
coincides with the joint rent, RF
j = Rj.6 Log-linearizing (17) and substituting (B.2) and
(B.4) for the eﬀort to determine the impact on the success probability yields
ˆ Rj = ˆ R
F




ˆ vj − (1 − sj) ˆ β − αˆ γ
i
. (18)
6Hence, the solution of the proﬁt share as stated in Proposition 1 reﬂects the principle of Pareto-
optimality as in Inderst and Mueller (2004).
133.2 Competition Among VCs
The proﬁt shares are chosen to maximize the VC’s rent which coincides with the joint
rent. The entrepreneur keeps a minimum share, but no more than that, to assure her
critical contribution to the ﬁrm without which no return would be possible at all. The
VC should receive the largest possible stake to bring her as close as possible to being the
full residual claimant on the returns to advice. This is required to bring the privately
determined level of advice as close as possible to the socially optimal level. On the other
hand, VCs must compete for ﬁnancing start-up ﬁrms by oﬀering an overall attractive
package to entrepreneurs. They can do so by oﬀering a high price bj+I−k for their share
sj w h i c hm u s tc o v e ra tl e a s tt h eu n ﬁnanced part of start-up cost but can also include
a lump-sum, success independent component bj.I no ﬀering a price, VCs aim to attract
good projects and to deter bad ones, especially if the bad ones result in a loss. Since VCs
can convert their proﬁts h a r e ssj after the ﬁrm is started and quality is revealed, they
can also diﬀerentiate the prices bj,w h e r ebG −bB is the conversion price to be paid if the
option to increase the share from sB to sG is exercised.
The VC’s surplus from a project of type j is πF
j = RF
j − bj − (I − k).V C s t r y t o
attract entrepreneurs with good signals who are very likely to have a good project, by
oﬀering a high conversion price resulting in a high value of bG for the same share sG,
possibly until πF
G =0 . Similarly, VCs will oﬀer a very low price bB to deter entrepreneurs
with low signals who are likely to be endowed with a bad project that might result in a
loss. If even the bad project is proﬁtable, the VC competes for this project by oﬀering
a low but positive price bB. If it is unproﬁtable, she would ask for a negative price, i.e.
a payment from entrepreneur to VC, to avoid losses that would have to be covered by
cross-subsidization. However, limited liability bj > 0 prevents this since entrepreneurs
have already invested their entire wealth k in the project and simply have no funds left.
If bB =0still results in a loss, the VC might raise her share sB to cut losses but this it not
possible either because raising it would violate the managerial incentive constraint and
provoke a certain failure. So the VC cannot cut her losses on a bad project any further
than paying the lowest possible price bB =0after I − k is sunk and project quality is
revealed. When the project turns out bad, she does not exercise the conversion option
14a n dm u s ti n c u ral o s s .I nt h i sc a s e ,t h eV Cw i l lh a v et om a k es t r i c t l yp o s i t i v ep r o ﬁts on
good projects to cover her losses by means of cross subsidization. The VC must break
even at least on average. To sum up, one must distinguish two cases:
(a) bj > 0; RF
j − (I − k)=bj,
(b) bG > 0; RF
G − (I − k) >b G,
bB =0 ; RF
B − (I − k) < 0.
(19)
In case (a), both projects are proﬁtable and the VC competes with prices bj that allow
her to break even on each project separately and, hence, on average as well. In case (b),
o n l yt h eg o o dp r o j e c ti sp r o ﬁtable and the bad one makes a loss. She thus sets the price
f o rab a dp r o j e c tt ot h el o w e s tp o s s i b l ev a l u ebB =0and oﬀers a conversion price such
that she makes a strictly positive proﬁto ng o o dp r o j e c t sa n dj u s tb r e a k se v e no na v e r a g e .
In this case, she cannot avoid cross-subsidizing from good to bad projects.
Knowing the expected surplus derived from a given contract, entrepreneurs decide
upon entry. The marginal entrant must have received a suﬃciently good signal. She
expects to be endowed with a good project with a minimum probability q that makes
her indiﬀerent between entrepreneurship and an alternative career. Entry of the marginal
entrepreneur with quality q determines the average probability Q(q) as explained in Ap-
pendix A and in (3). Since the VC might in fact face any entrant, she must consider the
average probability. Given Q, competition among VCs forces them to raise prices bj for
high quality ventures and cut them for bad ones until they just break even. The zero
proﬁtc o n d i t i o ni sΠF =
P
j QjπF













= I − k. (20)
This average break even condition must hold in all cases but it can be fulﬁlled in two
distinct ways. First, if both projects are proﬁtable, bj > 0 for all j, the VC competes
for each project separately and breaks even on each of them individually. Obviously,
she breaks even on average as well. There is no cross-subsidization. Second, if the bad
project is unproﬁt a b l ea si nc a s e( b )o f( 1 9 ) ,t h e nbB =0on account of limited liability.
Consequently, the VC makes losses on bad projects which must be covered with proﬁts
from good ones. The VC can break even only on average where competition for good
projects would raise the conversion price b = bG up from zero until (20) binds.
15The type speciﬁcp r o ﬁt shares together with prices bj can be understood as a very
simple representation of convertible debt. The interpretation rests on the fact that debt
and equity are really the same in our framework if we consider only a single project. The
VC provides a total amount of funds equal to bj +I −k to pay for capital expenses and to
compensate for the foregone outside option that is not covered by the entrepreneur sharing
in the proﬁt.7 The VC gets the return either as a proﬁts h a r eo rad e b tr e p a y m e n t .D e ﬁne
sBvB ≡ DB >b B + I − k as the debt repayment of a bad project that goes to the VC
if the project succeeds. The debt repayment DB exceeds the initial credit by an implicit
interest which must cover the credit losses from failed projects as well as any eﬀort costs
by the VC. Repayment of debt leaves all residual proﬁts (1 − sB)vB = vB − DB to the
entrepreneur. This way we can understand the project speciﬁcp r o ﬁt share as debt for a
bad project, allowing the VC to convert to a higher equity share sG >s B if the project
turns out good and if she is willing to pay the conversion price bG − bB. The conversion
is done after the project is started and quality is revealed. Converting to a higher share
reinforces the incentives to advise more intensively the good project and to add more
v a l u ea si ts h o u l db ed o n ef r o mt h es o c i a lv i e w p o i n t .
Proposition 2 (a) When bad projects are proﬁtable, competition among VCs raises prices
bj + I − k for the proﬁts h a r e ssj. The entire surplus goes to entrepreneurs. VCs break
even separately on each project type without cross-subsidization. (b) When bad projects
are unproﬁtable and limited liability binds, high quality entrepreneurs obtain less and low
quality entrepreneurs more than the joint surplus. VCs make positive proﬁts on high
quality ventures that subsidize losses on low quality projects. They break even on average.
Proof. Discussion of equations (19) and (20).
3.3 Self-Selection of Entrepreneurs
Agents who received suﬃciently good signals, start a ﬁrm and apply for VC ﬁnancing.










= w + k.
7In fact, the conversion price must cover the entire outside option w + k since the proﬁts h a r ej u s t
suﬃces to compensate for managerial eﬀort cost and leaves a zero rent to the entrepreneur.
16The marginal entrant thus comes with a project that is good with probability q and bad
with probability 1 − q. This marginal quality is
π
E =0 ⇒ q =
w + k − RE
B − bB
RE
G + bG − RE
B − bB
. (21)
Although we know that an entrepreneur obtains no rent beyond the compensation for
eﬀort, RE
j =0 , we keep these terms for better interpretation. The more realistic case of
loss-making bad projects gives bB =0and bG = b. With these simpliﬁcations, the critical
quality would be q =( w + k)/b.
Having chosen rent maximizing equity stakes, and taking average quality as given,
VCs compete for projects by setting prices bj.O ﬀering higher prices bj encourages entry
by lowering the critical quality q.U s eRE
j = Rj − RF
j and write the denominator in (21)
as RE
G+bG−RE


























Raising the conversion price bG lowers the critical probability q and thereby encourages
entry. The denominator stands for the income diﬀerence that the entrepreneur would
realize if she could exchange a bad for a good project, and ∇ gives the corresponding
income diﬀerence of the VC. Quite intuitively, the entrepreneur’s gain RG − RB −∇is
the total gain minus the VC’s share in the income gain.
When bad project are unproﬁtable to the VC, condition (19.b) applies and limited
liability binds, bB =0 , which creates a need for cross-subsidization. In this case, the
conversion price b = bG is ﬁxed by the VC’s average break even condition in (20),
Q · ∇ + R
F
B − bB − (I − k)=0 . (23)
When bad projects are unproﬁtable, (19.b) implies ∇ > 0. If limited liability were not
imposed, then the VC would compete with two positive prices bj until she breaks even on
each project separately as in (19.a), implying ∇ =0 . By (20), the VC would obviously
b r e a ke v e na l s oo na v e r a g e .
173.4 Eﬃciency
We ﬁrst turn to the identity of the marginal entrepreneur and the implied eﬃciency of
market entry. One could directly compare the constrained optimal allocation q∗ in (13)
with the market allocation in (21). Since q∗ follows from Yq =0 ,w ee v a l u a t ei n s t e a d
the welfare derivative Yq at the market allocation. If this derivative is zero, market entry
is optimal. Rewrite the break even condition (4) of the marginal entrepreneur, using
RE
j = Rj − RF
j and the deﬁnition of ∇ in (22),
π








− k − w =0 . (24)
Substituting this for w in (12), as it is evaluated in private equilibrium, yields
Yq = −
£
q · ∇ + R
F




Finally, replacing I − k by the VC’s break even condition (23) gives
Yq =( Q − q) · ∇ · eφ
0 (q). (26)
The positive correlation of the signal with project quality implies φ
0 (q) > 0, see (A.6),
where y = φ(q) is the inverted relationship of (A.2). We also have Q>q .T h ew e l f a r e
result with respect to entry thus depends on the sign of ∇ which follows from (19). If, as
in case (a), limited liability is not binding, the VC breaks even on each project separately
without cross-subsidization which gives ∇ =0 .E n t r y i s e ﬃcient in this case. If case
(b) applies and the limited liability condition is binding, then ∇ > 0. Preventing entry
of the marginal entrepreneur and thereby raising the value of the marginal probability q
would boost welfare, Yq > 0 by (26). With limited liability, the VC must cross-subsidize
from good to bad projects. Low quality entrepreneurs thus get a too favorably deal which
r e s u l t si ne x c e s se n t r y .
Further intuition about the reasons for excess entry is obtained by writing πE as in
(24) and using (5) to obtain πE = π − q∇−
£
RF
B − bB − (I − k)
¤
. Replacing the square
bracket by the VC’s zero proﬁt condition in (23) results in πE = π+(Q − q)·∇.I ft h e r ei s
no cross-subsidization, ∇ =0and the entrepreneur gets the entire social surplus, πE = π.
18She obtains the surplus by obtaining high prices bj since the rent to eﬀort is set to zero
in the interest of maximum revenue per project. If instead the limited liability constraint
necessitates cross-subsidization, we have ∇ > 0. Consequently, good entrepreneurs with
a high probability q>Qget less than the social surplus while low quality entrepreneurs
with q<Qget more than the joint surplus which induces excess entry.
The other distortion in this model might be the level of VC advice. Managerial eﬀort
cannot be distorted since it was assumed to be discrete. High eﬀort is critical for the
survival of the ﬁrm. The entrepreneur’s shirking would result in business failure with
certainty. If she reduced her eﬀort below this critical level, the success probability would
drop to zero. Hence, the VC will always assure the socially optimal high eﬀort l =1 .
Nevertheless, it is instructive to treat managerial eﬀort as continuous for the moment.




Yaj · daj + Ylj · dlj
¢
.
Substituting γ i nt h es q u a r eb r a c k e to fYa in (10) by the private optimality condition in
(15), and substituting similarly for β in Yl, yields












We have already discussed the distorted excess entry of entrepreneurs. The other
two terms indicate ineﬃciently low eﬀort by the VC and, if managerial eﬀort lj were
continuous, by the entrepreneur. Welfare would increase if VC advice could be stimulated.
In putting in more advice, the VC creates extra value pj
avj but can appropriate only a share
sjpj
avj since she must cede a share 1 − sj to the entrepreneur to secure her cooperation.
The diﬀerence between the social and private returns to VC advice is a spill-over to
entrepreneurs that the VC does not take account of when she decides about her own
input to the company. Advice is thus ineﬃciently low. A symmetric argument applies to
entrepreneur’s managerial eﬀort. The social return to eﬀort is p
j
lvj but the entrepreneur
gets only a share (1 − sj)p
j
lvj. The rest accrues to the VC to compensate her for advice
and the ﬁnancial funds I − k.I f h e r e ﬀort were continuous, the entrepreneur would
underinvest in eﬀort as well. However, we have much simpliﬁed our model by assuming
discrete eﬀort so that managerial eﬀort cannot be reduced below the critical, eﬃcient
level l∗ =1 , i.e. dl =0in the above formula. Otherwise the company would fail for sure.
Hence, the entrepreneur’s eﬀo r ti sa l w a y se ﬃcient in this model.
19Proposition 3 ( a )V Ca d v i c ei si n e ﬃciently low in equilibrium. (b) When limited lia-
bility binds for unproﬁtable projects, entry is excessive on the low quality margin.
Proof. See equation (27) and its discussion.
It is instructive to see under what conditions the above mentioned distortions in VC
ﬁnancing could be avoided. If we had a budget breaking third party as in Holmstrom
(1982) which can also be replicated as a tax transfer mechanism supplied by the govern-
ment as in Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2003), advice could be made eﬃcient. Basically, the
mechanism subsidizes the VC’s revenues ex post until she is full residual claimant on the
returns to advisory eﬀort, and ﬁnances the subsidy by a tax ex ante. If, in addition, the
entrepreneur could be made a residual claimant on the project type which is diﬀerent
from being residual claimant on the returns to eﬀort at the moral hazard stage, entry
would be eﬃcient as well. The entrepreneur would be residual claimant on the project
t y p ei fs h ea p p r o p r i a t e dt h ee n t i r ei n c o m ed i ﬀerence between good and bad projects. In
competitive market equilibrium, this would be possible only if low quality projects would
be proﬁtable as well, and is prevented otherwise by the limited liability constraint.
4C o m p a r a t i v e S t a t i c s
Equilibrium in the unrestricted case is fully recursive. The VC breaks even separately
on each venture, yielding bj = RF
j − I + k>0 even for the bad project. Since the
entrepreneur’s rent on eﬀort is zero by the incentive compatibility constraint, the VC gets
the entire joint rent, RE
j =0and RF
j = Rj. The entrepreneur, however, appropriates the
total surplus πE
j = πj by asking prices bj. Competitive VCs bid up prices until their own
surplus from ﬁnancing the project is exhausted, πF
j =0 . Substituting these prices into
(21) reveals the quality of the marginal entrant, q =( w + I − RB)/(RG − RB).T h i si s
the same formula as for socially optimal quality q∗ in (13). Marginal quality, however, will
not be the same since VC advice is ineﬃciently low, implying that Rj <R ∗
j. Nevertheless,
according to (27), welfare cannot be improved by encouraging entry since ∇ =0when
limited liability is not binding. The complete optimum is obtained only by encouraging
20VC advice until a = a∗ which yields Rj = R∗
j and therefore q = q∗ as well. This completes
the solution of the unconstrained case since all other variables are implied.
More realistic is the case where bad projects result in a loss, implying bB =0on
account of limited liability and bG = b. One is left with two unknowns, q and b,a n dt w o
restrictions: free entry of entrepreneurs in (21) and the average break-even condition of
VCs in (23). Using ∇ = RG − RB − b>0 yields
VC
D : q =( w + k)/b, V C
S : Q(q,θ) · (RG − RB − b)=I − k − RB. (28)
Entry of entrepreneurs creates demand for VC ﬁnance. The identity of the marginal
entrepreneur, as given by marginal quality q, is a downward sloping function of the con-
version price b. Figure 1 illustrates. The break-even condition of competitive VCs in (23)
stands for the supply of VC. VCs take entry and average quality as given and respond
by oﬀering a conversion price. The supply function gives the break even price b for any
given quality of the pool of applicants such that
P
j Q(qj)πF
j =0 . Since average and
marginal qualities are positively related, it is an upward sloping function of q. When the
quality of projects increases, in the sense that any given venture is more likely to be of
the proﬁtable type, then the ﬁnancier’s expected surplus rises. She competes by oﬀering
an even higher conversion price until she hits the break even condition. A higher price
means that the VC can oﬀer ﬁnance only to fewer ﬁrms with better quality. The supply
of VC declines on account of an increase in the required marginal quality.
The comparative statics can be entirely understood with Figure 1. The signs noted
below the exogenous variables in the supply and demand schedules indicate in which
direction the curves are shifted when the variable is increased. Consider, for example, an
increase in the market values vj of ventures. By proposition 1, rents Rj from managing
and advising a company increase which boosts the surplus πF
j o ft h eV C .G i v e na na v e r a g e
quality in the pool of applicants, VCs bid up the conversion price to attract more business,
until they break even. The supply schedule shifts to the right (not drawn). When the
VC is willing to pay a higher price when converting, the deal becomes more attractive to
entrepreneurs and attracts additional entry at the lower quality margin. Since the supply
schedule in Figure 1 is unchanged, a new equilibrium results with a higher conversion
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Fig. 1: Demand and Supply of Venture Capital
As another example, consider a change in the informativeness of signals. When market
and technological uncertainty increases, the potential of a new idea is more diﬃcult to
assess. The signals received by entrepreneurs become less informative which is captured
by the parameter θ<1 increasing towards one, see Appendix A. Consequently, people will
not be able to revise very much their expectations of having a good project relative to what
they believe in advance. The average and marginal probabilities Q>qof being endowed
with a good business idea will move closer to the prior probability ε. In fact, if the signal
were completely uninformative (θ =1 ), all would believe the same, implying Q = q = ε.
A lower information content of the signal reduces the possibility of self-selection into
entrepreneurship. In particular, the wedge between average and marginal quality shrinks
as (A.11) in the Appendix shows. Hence, for any given q, a lower information content
reduces the average quality in the pool of applicants and thereby forces VCs to oﬀer
less favorable deals by reducing the conversion price. The supply schedule shifts to the
left. Accordingly, entrepreneurs become more hesitant to start their own business. In
22the new equilibrium, a lower information content of signals which might be the result
of increased technological and market uncertainty, reduces the conversion price b and
raises the quality of the marginal entrant. Therefore, a less informative signal reduces
entrepreneurship. The eﬀect on average quality as stated in (A.11) seems ambiguous at
ﬁrst sight. On the one hand, a lower information content directly reduces average quality
in the pool but the fact that some low quality marginal entrepreneurs stay out works in
the opposite direction. According to (C.5) in the appendix, the direct eﬀect dominates.
The net eﬀect is a reduction in the average quality of VC backed start-up ﬁrms.
As a ﬁnal experiment, we discuss the consequences of agents being endowed with
more assets. All other shocks can be derived unambiguously from Figure 1 and are not
discussed in more detail. Since an increase in own assets shifts up the demand schedule
but also shifts to the right the supply schedule, the eﬀe c t so ne n t r ya r ea m b i g u o u sa tﬁrst
sight. When more own capital is at stake, the opportunity cost of starting a ﬁrm rises
and thereby shifts up the demand curve for VC. The fear of loosing own capital in case
of business failure raises the required marginal quality q and diminishes demand for VC.
On the other hand, more own capital reduces the need for external ﬁnancing. Given that
the VC ﬁnances a smaller amount I − k, she will compete with a higher conversion price
b to acquire the same proﬁts h a r e ssj. This in itself shifts the supply schedule to the right
and would attract more rather than fewer entrepreneurs. In the Appendix, we show in
(C.3-4) that the net eﬀect is positive. When more own equity is at stake, agents require
a more reliable signal for high quality since the VC contract rewards them only if the
quality turns out to be good. When the entrepreneur comes with more equity, VCs bear
less downside risk. They can reduce their losses from bad projects which would allow for
more ﬁnancing at the lower quality margin. The entrepreneur’s income will be low even
when the low potential ﬁrm successfully reaches maturity. Income will be just suﬃcient
to compensate for managerial eﬀort during the start-up phase but no more than that.
Entrepreneurs are exposed more to the downside risk when they are endowed with more
equity. The demand eﬀect dominates. More own equity results in entry of fewer ﬁrms
with higher quality on average. Demand for VC falls.8
8This result is best appreciated when considering coexistance of VC and bank ﬁnancing, see for
example Ueda (2004). It is an established result that ﬁrms with little collateral turn to VC while high
23The results are now summarized for the case that limited liability binds:
Proposition 4 (a) Higher market values vj or lower marginal eﬀort costs β and γ lead to
a higher conversion price, more entry and lower average quality. (b) More own capital k
and a larger outside wage w result in a higher price, less entry and lower average quality.
(c) A lower information content of signals (θ rises, reﬂecting increased technological and
market uncertainty) reduces the conversion price, entry and average quality. A larger
capital investment I has the same eﬀects, except that average quality increases.
Proof. Proposition 1, Figure 1 and Appendix C.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
Despite of the fact that project selection is presumably as important as the value added
role of VCs for the performance of VC backed compared to other ﬁrms, the literature has
largely focussed on the value added role. This paper proposed a descriptive model of VC
ﬁnancing when entrepreneurs propose projects with high or low market potential. Our
model of the VC industry features (i) an advisory role of VCs that is conditional on the
quality of the venture which is revealed after the ﬁrm is started and close cooperation
begins, (ii) a ﬁnancial contract that is interpreted as a simple form of convertible debt,
and (iii) self-selection into entrepreneurship of those persons who are more likely to be
endowed with a high potential business idea.
The proposed framework replicates a number of important stylized facts in VC ﬁnanc-
ing. In our model, VCs acquire a larger stake in high quality ventures and advise them
more intensively. Since self-selection of entrepreneurs according to quality is imperfect,
they are inevitably stuck with low potential ﬁrms as well. Should a venture turn out to
be of low quality, the ﬁrm will receive less intensive but still positive VC support which is
mainly motivated to cut losses from that ﬁrm. The VC contract to be announced before
quality of applicants becomes known must serve diﬀerent functions. The proﬁts h a r e s
equity ﬁrms prefer bank ﬁnancing.
24should be chosen to allocate incentives for managerial and advisory eﬀo r ti nav a l u em a x -
imizing way, implying a high VC share if the project turns out good, and a low share if
it is a looser. The prices that are oﬀered for these shares must be high enough to pay
for capital expenses. They should also be chosen to induce the right self-selection and
to attract those entrepreneurs who are more likely to be endowed with a proﬁtable busi-
ness idea. Since the contract must be posted before quality is known, it must allow for
suﬃcient ﬂexibility. Our model rationalizes a simple form of convertible debt, one of the
most widely used contracts in VC ﬁnancing. The contract posts a low proﬁts h a r et h a t
is suitable for low quality ﬁr m sa tap r i c et h a tc o v e r sn om o r et h a nt h ec a p i t a le x p e n s e s
that can not be ﬁnanced out of the entrepreneur’s own pocket. In addition, the contract
includes an option to convert, at a prespeciﬁed conversion price, to a higher equity stake
should the ﬁr mt u r no u tt ob eap r o ﬁtable type. The conversion is exercised and the
conversion price paid after the ﬁrm is started and project quality is revealed.
The contract induces the right self-selection because it rewards entrepreneurs much
more when the project in fact turns out to be of high potential. In this case, the VC
converts to the high proﬁt share and pays a conversion price that additionally rewards
the entrepreneur for having delivered a high potential project. In fact, competition among
VCs for good projects bids up the conversion price to the largest possible extent until VCs
hit their break even condition. Entrepreneurs thereby appropriate most of the surplus
from good projects while they obtain no surplus from a bad project when the VC doesn’t
exercise her option. The contract is therefore particularly attractive for entrepreneurs
who have received a good signal and are, thus, very likely to be endowed with a high
quality project, compared to others who have received a less inviting signal.
When considering the eﬃciency of the market equilibrium, we have identiﬁed two
conditions for an eﬃcient allocation of eﬀort and entry. First, optimal eﬀort requires that
an agent is full residual claimant on the returns to her own eﬀort input as the literature
on double moral hazard has emphasized. This is not possible since the entrepreneur
needs external ﬁnancing and thus must share proﬁts with the VC. Advice is therefore
ineﬃciently low in our model. Second, eﬃcient entry requires that the entrepreneur is full
residual claimant on the project type, meaning that she gets all the extra return when
25moving from a bad to a good project. Again this is not possible when bad projects are
unproﬁtable to the VC and limited liability binds so that the entrepreneur cannot be
asked to pay for the loss. In this case, the VC must cross-subsidize from good to bad
projects which implies that low quality entrepreneurs get a too favorable deal. Hence,
entry is excessive at the low quality margin.
Given these results on eﬃciency, the policy implications are in principle clear. Policy
should ﬁnd ways to stimulate VC eﬀort by favorably treating ex post returns on projects.
On the other hand, policies should try to restrict entry of marginal entrepreneurs who are
rather likely to be endowed with low quality projects. What speciﬁc policy instruments
could achieve these goals is left for future research. It also seems that the proposed
framework is suﬃciently tractable. It should thus be explored whether this self-selection
framework lends itself to consider the coexistence of bank and VC ﬁnanced ﬁrms. It would
be particularly interesting to see whether such an extended framework can explain the
diﬀerential performance of bank versus VC ﬁnanced ﬁr m s ,a n dt ow h a te x t e n ti ti sd u e
to selection eﬀects rather than the value added role of VCs. Recent empirical work by
Sorensen (2005) has disentangled the reasons for such diﬀerential performance. Applied
theoretical work could try to identify those structural parameters that shift the relative
importance of selection versus advice in one or the other way.
Appendix
A Signals and Probabilities
Projects are either good and bad, j ∈ {G,B}. The true proportion of good ideas is ε.
In the beginning, agents do not know the type but receive an informative signal y that
is positively correlated with project quality. A good signal is thus received by the good









j (y)=−ej (y). (A.1)
26The marginal probability of having a good project is
q =P r( G|y)=
εeG(y)
e
,e ≡ εeG (y)+( 1− ε)eB (y). (A.2)
The average probability of observing a speciﬁcs i g n a ly by any of the two types is e. Good
types are much less likely than bad types to receive a low signal, implying eG (y) <e B (y)
for y small. In contrast, high signal values are more frequently received by good types,
implying eG (y) >e B (y) for y large. Consequently, the marginal probability increases in
the signal value.
The average probability for a good idea among all agents with signals y0 >yis




,E ≡ εEG(y)+( 1− ε)EB (y). (A.3)
The total number of signals y0 > y received by all agents is E.
Agents pursue entrepreneurship only if they perceive a suﬃciently high probability
q of having a good project. They will thus need to receive a suﬃciently good signal y.
Inverting (A.2) establishes a correspondence y = φ(q). By (A.3), the average probability
Q of a good project among all agents with signals better than y = φ(q) is
Q =P r( G|y
0 ≥ φ(q)). (A.4)
Entry decision thus establishes a cut-oﬀ value or marginal probability q a n da na v e r a g e
probability Q>qof a good project in the entire pool of applicants.
We now determine the impact of the marginal entrepreneur with probability q on the
average probability Q. Using (A.2) and (A.3), we ﬁrst calculate
dQ
dy




The eﬀect is positive with increasing signals and probabilities, yielding Q>q . It will also
be useful to get, from equation (A.2),
dq
dy











The sign of the square bracket must be positive for the signal to be informative of the




(Q − q) · e/E




27We now use a special functional form for the density of signals. The parameter θ
conveniently measures the informativeness of signals,
eG (y)=θexp(−θy)=θEG (y),e B (y)=e x p( −y)=EB (y),θ < 1. (A.8)
If θ =1 ,t h e neG = eB and EG = EB.I nt h i sc a s e ,q = Q = ε by (A.2-3), and the signal
is not informative. If θ<1, the good type receives a low signal with smaller density than
the bad type, eG(0) = θ<e B (0) = 1. The density of higher signals falls more rapidly
with the bad type so that eG(y) >e B (y) for y large enough. The two density functions





B/eB =1− θ. (A.9)
The functional form in (A.8) allows for a convenient closed form solution of the relation
between average and marginal quality which also shows how this relation depends on the
informativeness parameter. Substitute eG = θEG and eB = EB from (A.8) into (A.2),






q +( 1− q)θ
>q . (A.10)
The informativeness assumption θ<1 implies Q>q . If the signal were not informative,
then average and marginal quality would be equal, Q = q, as argued before. The elasticity
of Q with respect to q follows from the log-linearization where the hat notation indicates
a relative change, ˆ Q ≡ dlnQ = dQ/Q. Rewrite (A.10) as (1 − Q)q =( 1 − q)θQ,w e
obtain the log-linear form
ˆ Q = µ · ˆ q − (1 − Q) · ˆ θ, µ ≡ (1 − Q)/(1 − q). (A.11)
As a consistency check, we use (A.9) and write the coeﬃcient of (A.7), ˆ Q = µˆ q,a sµ =
(Q−q)e/E
(1−q)(1−θ)Q. Using again (A.8) to rewrite e yields e/E = θQ+(1− Q). Rearranging (A.10)
as (1 − Q)q =( 1− q)θQ,o n eo b t a i n sθQ =( 1− Q)q/(1 − q), and thereby (1 − θ)Q =
(Q − q)/(1 − q). Using these expressions to replace θQ in the numerator and (1 − θ)Q




1−q as in (A.11).
28B Proof of Proposition 1
Part (a): Section 3.1 showed that aj and sj satisfy the two conditions in (15) with
equality. Using (1) and substituting (16) into the condition on lj in (15) yields












This equation implicitly determines the proﬁt share. The zj-function returns a zero for
values sj =0and sj =1 , and is positive and concave in between. Its slope turns from
positive to negative as sj starts from zero and moves beyond α. With an interior solution,
there are two values for sj of which the larger is the relevant proﬁt maximizing one by
the arguments in the paragraph preceding (16). Hence, the slope of the zj-function must
be negative at the optimal value of sj, implying α<s j. The inequality sG >s B follows
f r o mt h ef a c tt h a tah i g h e rv a l u evG >v B reduces the r.h.s. of (B.1) and shifts down the
horizontal line which intersects the z-function.
Part (b): We show this by linearizing the system in (15). The notation ˆ a ≡ da/a
indicates a percentage change where da is the absolute deviation from an initial value of
a. The functional form (1) yields together with the equilibrium value lj =1 ,
pj = lj · (aj)
α ⇒ aj · p
j
a = α · pj, ˆ pj = αˆ aj, ˆ p
j
a = −(1 − α)ˆ aj. (B.2)
The comparative static eﬀects of shocks to exogenous parameters can be uncovered by
log-linearization of (15). Using (B.1) yields
(1 − α)ˆ aj =ˆ sj +ˆ vj − ˆ γ,
sj
1 − sj
ˆ sj = αˆ aj +ˆ vj − ˆ β. (B.3)
The ﬁrst equation shows how a VC increases advice upon receiving a larger proﬁts h a r e ,
the second relates to the entrepreneur’s incentives. If she receives more advice, her own
incentives for eﬀo r tc a nb ea s s u r e dw i t hal o w e rs h a r e1 − sj, or a higher share sj for the





ˆ vj − sjˆ γ − (1 − sj) ˆ β
i




ˆ vj − αˆ γ − (1 − α) ˆ β
i
. (B.4)
29Part (c): This part is shown in equations (18) and (19) of the main text.
C Comparative Statics
Log-linearize (28) to obtain comparative static results. Deﬁne the share δ ≡ k/(w + k) of
own capital in the total opportunity cost of entrepreneurs. The share of foregone wages
is 1−δ = w/(w + k). Use this to obtain the log-linearized form of the demand schedule.
The relative change in average quality was already shown in (A.11). Use this together
with ∇ = RG − RB − b>0 (or ∇ˆ ∇ = RG ˆ RG − RB ˆ RB − bˆ b) in the log-linearized form of
the supply schedule in (28), Q∇
³
ˆ Q + ˆ ∇
´
= Iˆ I − kˆ k − RB ˆ RB,w h i c hg i v e s
ˆ q = −ˆ b +( 1− δ)ˆ w + δˆ k,
ˆ b =
h




Substituting the demand function ˆ q into the supply function yields
ˆ b =
(1 − δ)Q∇µˆ w +( δQ∇µ + k)ˆ k − (1 − Q)Q∇ˆ θ − Iˆ I +
P
j QjRj ˆ Rj
(b + ∇µ)Q
. (C.2)
Substituting back into the demand schedule ˆ q yields the marginal entrant,
ˆ q =
(1 − δ)Qb ˆ w +( bQ − w − k)δˆ k +( 1− Q)Q∇ˆ θ + Iˆ I −
P
j QjRj ˆ Rj
(b + ∇µ)Q
. (C.3)
A l lr e s u l t sa r eu n i q u ee x c e p tf o rt h ei m p a c to fk. Substituting the demand schedule in
(28) for w + k yields
Qb − w − k =( Q − q)b>0. (C.4)
The eﬀect of θ on average quality seems ambiguous at ﬁrst sight. Substituting the




∇ˆ θ, ˆ Q = −
(1 − Q)b
b + ∇µ
· ˆ θ. (C.5)
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